



# Can we understand Air Navigation Service Provision performance and impact on ownership form?

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Founding Members



# Motivation

Air navigation service provision is a monopoly service by definition

## Ownership

- most are government departments
- some are commercialized government owned corporations
- few are purely private with aviation stakeholders:
  - NATS: public private partnership with dividends
  - NavCanada: nonprofit entity
  - Skyguide: government controlled joint stock company

## Regulation

- ICAO advises cost based charges
- EU price caps services using Performance Review Board

*is there a preferable model?*

## Elias (Congressional Research Service Report, 2015)

- no conclusive evidence that any institutional set-up is superior with respect to productivity, cost-effectiveness, service quality, safety and security
- Improvements in cost-effectiveness and performance and faster implementation of technologies as a result of access to financial markets are observed

## Lewis (IPMJ 2004)

- analyse institutional arrangements for governance of air navigation services of 6 nations
- focus on how boards of public organizations can act as a proxy for market feedback
- conclusions suggest that ATC most effectively provided on not-for-profit basis, with indirect participation by stakeholders including airlines and airport operators.
- no conclusions on impact on efficiency or production

## Button & Neiva (JTEP 2014)

- bootstrapped data envelopment analysis with variable returns to scale for 36 European ATC systems for period 2002-2009
- find economics of density or scale as providers with higher number of sectors also more efficient
- state that result on ownership effect is *counterintuitive* as providers closely linked to government are relatively more efficient

## Bilotkach et al. (TR part A 2015)

- analyze European ATC providers from 2002–2011 applying data envelopment analysis
- providers' productivity improved due to technical rather than allocative efficiency
- some trend reversals in the post-2008 crisis period are also observed

# outline



Stochastic production function

Stochastic cost function

Conclusions

most data from ATM cost-effectiveness benchmarking reports

- assembled by the Performance Review Unit
- representative panel dataset of 37 European ATC providers covering 9 years (2006-2014)

# Data: Variables in Production Function

## En-route

- Y total flight hours controlled
- $X_1$  ATCO hours in air control centers
- $X_2$  en-route sectors
- $Z_1$  seasonality
- $Z_2$  complexity

## Terminal

- Y IFR airport movements
- $X_1$  ATCO hours APP+TWR
- $X_2$  (NBV/ Capital goods price index) \* ppp

$$\text{where ppp} = \frac{\text{Purchasing power parity}}{\text{Exchange rate}}$$

- $Z_1$  complexity

# Methodology: stochastic production function

$$\ln(IFRkm_{it}) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \ln(ATCO_{it}) + \beta_2 \ln(sectors_{it}) + V_{it} - U_{it}$$

$$\text{where } U_{it} = \partial_0 + \partial_1 Seasonality_{it} + \partial_2 Complexity_{it} + W_{it}$$

$i$	$i^{th}$ ATC provider
$t$	year of the observation
$z_{it}$	environmental variables
$V_{it}$	error term
$U_{it}$	inefficiency term with mean $z_{it}\delta$
$w_{it}$	random variable


using 1<sup>st</sup> stage results estimating production function  
 in 2<sup>nd</sup> stage estimate the inefficiency of ATC providers

# Results of SFA production model with time decay in inefficiency for en-route control (Battese and Coelli 1995)


PRODUCTION FUNCTION		Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
		<i>En-route</i>					
<i>Input</i>	<i>Output</i>	Total IFR flight hours controlled		Total IFR flight hours controlled		Total IFR flight hours controlled	
		Coef.	P> Z	Coef.	P> Z	Coef.	P> Z
Labor in ACC (hours)		0.497	0.000	0.392	0.000	0.60	0.000
En-route sectors		0.518	0.000	0.661	0.000	0.33	0.000
constant		5.311	0.000	6.432	0.000	4.48	0.000
<i>Z - Variables explaining the mean of the inefficiency (Mu)</i>							
Seasonality				1.74	0.000	4.093	0.000
Complexity						-1.212	0.000
sigma_v		0.235	0.000	0.207	0.000	0.236	0.000
sigma_u		3.380	0.578	0.432	0.000	0.465	0.000
Log Likelihood		-162.773		-151.364		-96.163	
Lambda		14.365	0.018	2.087	0.000	1.970	0.000



# Average Production Efficiency Estimates for En-Route ATC (2004-2014)




# Average Productive Efficiency Estimates per En-route ATC provider



# Results of SFA production model with time decay in inefficiency for terminal control (Battese and Coelli 1995)

PRODUCTION FUNCTION		Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
		<i>Terminal</i>					
<i>Input</i>	<i>Output</i>	IFR airport movements		IFR airport movements		IFR airport movements	
		Coef.	P> Z	Coef.	P> Z	Coef.	P> Z
Labor in TWR and APP		0.529	0.000	0.528	0.000	0.575	0.000
Net Book Value of Fixed Assets		0.558	0.000	0.488	0.000	0.428	0.000
Seasonality				-2.818	0.000	-3.094	0.000
constant		2.997	0.000	3.372	0.000	3.267	0.000
<i>Z - Variables explaining the mean of the inefficiency (Mu)</i>							
Complexity						-0.845	0.00
sigma_v		0.095	0.250	0.243	0.000	0.230	0.000
sigma_u		0.422	0.000	2.170	0.671	0.499	0.000
Log Likelihood		-163.974		-64.720		-53.484	
Lambda		4.428	0.018	8.923	0.081	2.174	0.000

# Average Productive Efficiency Estimates for Terminal ATC (2004 to 2014)



# outline

Stochastic production function

**Stochastic cost function**

Conclusions

# Data: Variables in cost function

where

$$\text{cost of operation index} = \frac{\text{intermediate goods and energy price index}}{\text{ppp}}$$

## En-route

$$Y = \frac{\text{total cost ACC}}{\text{cost of operation index}}$$

$$X_1 = \text{total IFR flight hours controlled}$$

$$X_2 = \frac{\text{total staff cost/ATCO hours in ACC}}{\text{cost of operation index}}$$

$$X_3 = \frac{(\text{depreciation cost} + \text{cost of capital}) / (\text{NBV} / \text{capital goods price index})}{\text{cost of operation index}}$$

# Data: Variables in cost function



$X_4$  seasonality

$X_5$  complexity

$X_7$  corporatized (1 if “Gov corp”, 0 otherwise)

$X_8$  agency (1 if “Agency”, 0 otherwise)

$Z_1$  complexity

# Methodology: stochastic cost function

$$C_{it} = \beta X_{it} + V_{it} - U_{it}$$

$$\text{where } U_{it} = \partial_0 + \partial_2 \text{Complexity}_{it} + W_{it}$$

costs  $C_i$  are logged

explanatory variables  $X_i$


- normalized and logged
- factor prices  $w_i$
- output level  $y_i$




# Results of SFA cost model with time decay in inefficiency for en-route control (Battese and Coelli 1995)

COST FUNCTION		Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
		En-route					
Input	Output	$\frac{total\ cost}{op.\ cost\ index}$		$\frac{total\ cost}{op.\ cost\ index}$		$\frac{total\ cost}{op.\ cost\ index}$	
		Coef.	P> Z	Coef.	P> Z	Coef.	P> Z
Total IFR flight hours controlled		0.902	0.000	0.926	0.000	0.969	0.000
$\frac{labor\ cost}{op.\ cost\ index}$		0.308	0.000	0.243	0.000	0.319	0.000
$\frac{capital\ cost}{op.\ cost\ index}$		0.303	0.000	0.319	0.000	0.280	0.000
ownership gov/corp				0.402	0.000	0.556	0.000
ownership agency				0.212	0.000	0.396	0.000
complexity		0.104		0.157	0.000	0.768	0.000
seasonality		1.368		1.344	0.000	1.891	0.000
constant		-2.342		-3.428	0.000	-5.193	0.000
Z - Variables explaining the mean of the inefficiency (Mu)							
complexity						-1.015	0.000
sigma_v		0.333	0.000	0.321	0.000	0.223	0.000
sigma_u		0.098	0.990	0.077	0.983	0.239	0.000
Log Likelihood		-103.400		-91.679		-58.155	
Lambda		0.294	0.970	0.240		1.072	0.000


# Average Cost Efficiency Estimates for En-route ATC 2006-2014



# Average Cost Efficiency Estimates per En-Route ATC Provider




# some constant efficiency levels and some improving...




# Results of SFA cost model with time decay in inefficiency for terminal control (Battese and Coelli 1995)

COST FUNCTION		Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
		<b><i>Terminal</i></b>					
<i>Input</i>	<i>Output</i>	$\frac{total\ cost}{op.\ cost\ index}$		$\frac{total\ cost}{op.\ cost\ index}$		$\frac{total\ cost}{op.\ cost\ index}$	
		Coef.	P> Z	Coef.	P> Z	Coef.	P> Z
	IFR airport movements	0.796	0.000	0.921	0.000	0.931	0.000
	$\frac{labor\ cost}{op.\ cost\ index}$	0.362	0.000	0.403	0.000	0.413	0.000
	$\frac{capital\ cost}{op.\ cost\ index}$	0.252	0.000	0.327	0.000	0.280	0.000
	seasonality			3.115	0.000	3.274	0.000
	complexity					0.124	0.036
	constant	-3.459	0.000	-5.647	0.000	-6.190	0.000
<i>Z - Variables explaining the mean of the inefficiency (Mu)</i>							
	complexity					-0.742	0.01
	constant					0.578	0.05
	sigma_v	0.436	0.000	0.252	0.000	0.218	0.000
	sigma_u	0.088	0.965	1.017	0.525	0.481	0.000
	Log Likelihood	-181.422		-99.451		-86.923	
	Lambda	0.201	0.920	4.033	0.011	2.201	0.000

# Average Cost Efficiency Estimates for Terminal ATC (2006 to 2014)



# Average Cost Efficiency Estimates per terminal ATC provider



# Conclusions

Could we estimate efficiency levels?

- yes! there is sufficient data (although needs to be cleaned)
- seasonality causes lower production levels and substantially higher production & cost inefficiencies
- complexity causes lower production levels and adds costs
- but... complexity also leads to higher managerial efficiency levels

Would it be possible to create individual price caps?

- yes! there are substantial inefficiencies with price cap reductions of over 10% for every provider potentially
- average cost inefficiencies of 25%

Does ownership matter?

- stochastic cost function identifies the private providers as more efficient than their government owned counterparts